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The Dirichlet Mechanism for Differential Privacy on the Unit Simplex
Parham Gohari, Bo Wu, Matthew Hale, Ufuk Topcu
Abstract— As members of a network share more information
with each other and network providers, sensitive data leakage
raises privacy concerns. To address this need for a class of
problems, we introduce a novel mechanism that privatizes
vectors belonging to the unit simplex. Such vectors can be
seen in many applications, such as privatizing a decision-
making policy in a Markov decision process. We use differential
privacy as the underlying mathematical framework for these
developments. The introduced mechanism is a probabilistic
mapping that maps a vector within the unit simplex to the
same domain according to a Dirichlet distribution. We find
the mechanism well-suited for inputs within the unit simplex
because it always returns a privatized output that is also in
the unit simplex. Therefore, no further projection back onto
the unit simplex is required. We verify the privacy guarantees
of the mechanism for two cases, namely, identity queries and
average queries. In the former case, we derive expressions for
the differential privacy level of privatizing a single vector within
the unit simplex. In the latter case, we study the mechanism for
privatizing the average of a collection of vectors, each of which
is in the unit simplex. We establish a trade-off between the
strength of privacy and the variance of the mechanism output,
and we introduce a parameter to balance the trade-off between
them. Numerical results illustrate these developments.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many decision-making problems, a policy-maker forms
a control policy based on data collected from the individuals
in a network. The gathered data often contains sensitive
information, which raises privacy concerns [1]. In some
applications, privatizing sensitive data has been achieved by
adding carefully calibrated noise to sensitive data and func-
tions thereof [2], [3], [4]. These noise-additive approaches
are well-suited to some classes of numerical data, though
sensitive data may take a form ill-suited to them. For exam-
ple, developments in [5] explored symbolic control systems
in which additive noise cannot be meaningfully implemented.
In this work, we privatize data inputs that belong to
the unit simplex, i.e., the set of vectors with non-negative
entries that sum to one. Such vectors are seen in many
decision-making problems. For example, in Markov deci-
sion processes (MDPs), the goal is to find a total-reward-
maximizing policy [6], [7]. In certain cases, it is shown that
the optimal policy is a randomized function that maps from
the MDP’s states to a probability distribution on the set of
actions available at that state, see, e.g., [8], [9], [10]. Finite
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action sets give rise to discrete, finitely supported probability
distributions, which can be formalized as vectors with non-
negative entries summing to one. Policies of this kind arise in
applications such as autonomous driving [11] and the smart
power grid [12], and revealing them can therefore reveal
individuals’ behaviors. Thus, there is a need to privatize such
policies, and this use represents one application of privatizing
sensitive data in the unit simplex. Existing noise-additive
approaches will not, in general, produce a privatized vector
in the unit simplex, and we therefore propose a new approach
to privacy for this context.
In this paper, we use differential privacy as the underlying
mathematical framework for privacy. Differential privacy,
first introduced in [13], is designed to protect the exact
values of sensitive pieces of data, while preserving their
usefulness in aggregate statistical analyses. Two desirable
properties of differential privacy are (i) that it is immune
to post-processing [14], in the sense that arbitrary post-hoc
transformations of privatized data do not weaken its privacy
guarantees, and (ii) that it is robust to side information, in that
gaining additional information about data-producing entities
does not weaken its privacy guarantees by much [15]. As
a result, differential privacy has been frequently used as
the mathematical formulation of privacy in both computer
science and, more recently, in control theory [16], [17], [18].
As the main contribution of this paper, we introduce a
mechanism that privatizes a vector within the unit simplex.
A mechanism is a probabilistic mapping from some pre-
defined domain to a pre-defined range, and a mechanism is
used to privatize sensitive data. This paper develops a novel
mechanism using the Dirichlet distribution, and we therefore
call it the Dirichlet mechanism. The Dirichlet distribution
is a multivariate distribution supported on the unit simplex,
which makes it a natural choice for this setting because its
outputs are always elements of the unit simplex.
In our developments, we use probabilistic differential
privacy, which is known to imply that the conventional form
of differential privacy also holds [19]. Then, we show that
the Dirichlet mechanism satisfies probabilistic differential
privacy for identity queries. By an identity query, we mean
privatizing a single vector within the unit simplex. In the
course of proving these privacy guarantees, based on the
assumptions we provide, we prove the log-concavity of the
cumulative distribution function of a Dirichlet distribution.
The proof that we present may be of independent interest in
ongoing research on convexity analysis of special functions
such as [20]. In this vein, we prove a generalization of
Theorem 6 of [21] which has been used in later works for
stochastic programming [22].
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Beyond identity queries, we further show that the Dirichlet
mechanism is differentially private for average queries, in
which we privatize the average of a collection of vectors,
each within the unit simplex. We derive analytic expressions
for privacy levels of the averaging case, and show that
the Dirichlet mechanism provides privacy protections whose
strength increases with the number of vectors being averaged.
Following the convention in the differential privacy litera-
ture, we also analyze the accuracy of the output of the mech-
anism [14], [23]. In particular, we evaluate the accuracy of
the Dirichlet mechanism in terms of the expected value and
the variance of its outputs. Similar to additive noise methods,
the Dirichlet mechanism output has the same expected value
as its input, which implies that its privatized outputs obey
a distribution centered on the underlying sensitive data. We
show that there exists a trade-off between the privacy and
the variance of the output of the mechanism. The derived
expression for the output variance shows how to tune the
worst-case variance by scaling the input by a parameter that
we introduce in the mechanism definition.
We emphasize that additive noise privacy mechanisms
are ill-suited to privacy on the unit simplex because they
add noise of infinite support. As a result, such mecha-
nisms will output a vector that does not belong to the unit
simplex; attempting to normalize the noise would result in
its distribution not being one known to provide differential
privacy. It is for these reasons that we develop the Dirichlet
mechanism. Although its form appears quite different from
existing mechanisms, they are related through membership
in a broad class of probability distributions. In particu-
lar, the Laplacian, Gaussian, and exponential mechanisms
all use distributions belonging to a parameterized family
of exponential distributions. The outputs of the Dirichlet
distribution are equivalent to a normalized vector of i.i.d.
exponential random variables, which means their distribution
also belongs to the exponential family. This connection
reveals why we should expect the Dirichlet mechanism to
be well-suited to differential privacy, and the developments
of this paper formalize and confirm this intuition.
We also point out here that the exponential mechanism is
another widely used differentilly private mechanism which
can be used for sensitive data ill-suited to additive ap-
proaches [14]. However, the exponential mechanism can
be computationally demanding to implement for privacy
applications with many possible outputs. The output space
here is the unit simplex, which contains uncountably many
elements. The resulting complexity of such an implementa-
tion therefore makes it infeasible [24], especially in large
dimensions, and we avoid it here.
An extended version of this paper which includes the
proofs to the technical lemmas used in this paper can be
found at [25].
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
In this section we establish notation used throughout the
paper. We represent the real numbers by R and the positive
reals by R+. For a positive integer n, let [n] := {1, . . . , n}.
We denote the unit simplex in Rn by ∆n where
∆n :=
{
x ∈ Rn |
n∑
i=1
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n]
}
.
We use ∆◦n to represent the interior of ∆n. Letting W ⊆
[n− 1] and η, η¯ ∈ (0, 1), we then define the set
∆(η,η¯)n :=
{
p ∈ ∆◦n |
∑
i∈W
pi ≤ 1− η¯, pi ≥ η for all i ∈W
}
.
Letting p be a vector in Rn, we use the notation p(i,j) to
denote the vector (pi, pj)T ∈ R2, where (·)T is the transpose
of a vector, and p−(i,j) ∈ Rn−2 to denote the vector p with
ith and jth entries removed. P[·] denotes the probability of
an event. For a random variable, E[·] denotes its expectation
and Var[·] denotes its variance. We use the notation | · | for
the cardinality of a finite set. || · ||1 denotes the 1-norm of a
vector. We also use special functions
Γ(z) :=
∫ ∞
0
xz−1 exp (−x)dx, z ∈ R+,
beta(a, b) :=
∫ 1
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1dt, a, b ∈ R+.
B. Differential Privacy
Intuitively, differential privacy guarantees that two nearby
inputs to a privacy mechanism will generate statistically
similar outputs. In differential privacy, the notion of “nearby”
is formally defined by an adjacency relation, and we define
adjacency over the unit simplex as follows.
Definition 1. For a constant b ∈ (0, 1] and fixed set W , two
vectors p, q ∈ ∆(η,η¯)n are said to be b-adjacent if there exist
indices i, j ∈W such that
p−(i,j) = q−(i,j) and ||p− q||1 ≤ b.
In words, two vectors are different if they differ in two
entries by an amount not more than b. Ordinarily, differential
privacy considers sensitive data differing in a single entry,
e.g., one entry in a database [14]. However, it is not possible
to do so for an element of the unit simplex because changing
only a single entry would violate the condition that vectors’
entries sum to one. We therefore consider privacy with the
above adjacency relation. Privacy itself is defined next.
Definition 2. (Probabilistic differential privacy; [26])
Let b ∈ (0, 1] and W ⊆ [n − 1] be given. Fix a probability
space (Ω,F ,P). A mechanism M : ∆η,η¯n ×Ω 7→ ∆n is said
to be probabilistically (, δ)-differentially private if, for all
p ∈ ∆η,η¯n , we can partition the output space ∆n into two
disjoint sets Ω1,Ω2, such that
P[M(p) ∈ Ω2] ≤ δ, (1)
and for all q ∈ ∆η,η¯n b-adjacent to p and for all x ∈ Ω1,
log
(
P[M(p) = x]
P[M(q) = x]
)
≤ .
Probabilistic differential privacy is known to imply con-
ventional differential privacy [26], and, with a slight abuse of
terminology, we refer to Definition 2 simply as “differential
privacy” for the remainder of the paper.
C. Dirichlet Mechanism
One contribution of this paper is to present a differentially
private mechanism that, without any need of projection,
maps elements of ∆n to ∆n. In order to do so, we first
introduce the Dirichlet mechanism. A Dirichlet mechanism
with parameter k ∈ R+, denoted by M(k)D , takes as input a
vector p ∈ ∆◦n and outputs x ∈ ∆n according to the Dirichlet
probability distribution function (PDF) centered on p, i.e.,
P[M(k)D (p) = x] =
1
B(kp)
n−1∏
i=1
xkpi−1i
(
1−
n−1∑
i=1
xi
)kpn−1
,
where
B(kp) :=
n∏
i=1
Γ(kpi)
Γ
(
k
n∑
i=1
pi
) (2)
is the multi-variate beta function.
We later use the parameter k to adjust the trade-off that
we establish between the accuracy and the privacy level
of the Dirichlet mechanism. Next, we establish the privacy
guarantees that the Dirichlet mechanism provides.
III. DIRICHLET MECHANISM FOR DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY OF IDENTITY QUERIES
We begin by analyzing identity queries under the Dirichlet
mechanism. Here, a sensitive vector p is directly input to the
Dirichlet mechanism to make it approximately indistinguish-
able from other adjacent sensitive vectors. To show the level
of privacy that holds, we first bound δ, then bound .
A. Computing δ
Fix W ⊆ [n − 1]. In accordance with Definition 2, we
partition the output space of the Dirichlet mechanism into
two sets Ω1,Ω2 defined by
Ω1 := {x ∈ ∆n | xi ≥ γ for all i ∈W} (3)
and
Ω2 := {x ∈ ∆n | x /∈ Ω1}, (4)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that defines these sets.
Our goal is to show that the Dirichlet mechanism output
belongs to Ω1 with high probability. Let p be a vector
in ∆(η,η¯)n . In the next lemma we show how to calculate
P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1].
Lemma 1. Let W ⊆ [n− 1] be a given set of indices which
is used to construct ∆(η,η¯)n , let p ∈ ∆(η,η¯)n and let
Ar :=
x ∈ Rr−1 | ∑
i∈[r−1]
xi ≤ 1, xi ≥ γ for all i ∈W
 ,
for all r ≥ |W | + 1. Then, for a Dirichlet mechanism with
parameter k ∈ R+, we have that P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] is equal
to∫
A|W |+1
∏
i∈W
xkpi−1i
(
1− ∑
i∈W
xi
)k(1− ∑
i∈W
pi)−1∏
i∈W
dxi
B(kp˜W )
,
where p˜W ∈ ∆|W |+1 is equal to p with its entries outside
the set W removed, and with an additional entry equal to
1− ∑
i∈W
pi appended as its final entry.
Proof. Without loss of generality, take W = [|W |]. In order
to find P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1], we need to integrate the Dirichlet
PDF over the region An. Therefore, we need to evaluate the
(n− 1)-fold integral∫
An
n−1∏
i=1
xkpi−1i
(
1−
n−1∑
i=1
xi
)kpn−1
dxn−1 . . . dx1
B(kp)
.
(5)
Using a method similar to the one adopted in [27], let y :=
n−2∑
i=1
xi. Then we can rewrite (5) as
1
B(kp)
∫
An−2
∫ 1−y
0
n−1∏
i=1
xkpi−1i (1− y − xn−1)kpn−1
dxn−1 . . . dx1. (6)
Now let u := xn−11−y and take the inner integral with respect
to u. Then (6) becomes
1
B(kp)
∫
An−2
n−2∏
i=1
xkpi−1i (1−y)k(pn−1+pn)−1
∫ 1
0
ukpn−1−1
(1− u)kpn−1du dxn−2 . . . dx1.
From the definition of the beta function, we have∫ 1
0
ukpn−1−1(1− u)kpn−1du = beta(kpn−1, kpn).
Using the gamma function representation of beta functions,
i.e.,
beta(a, b) =
Γ(a)Γ(b)
Γ(a+ b)
, a, b ∈ R+, (7)
and (2), we find that P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] is equal to
1
B(kp)
Γ(kpn−1)Γ(kpn)
Γ(k(pn−1 + pn))
∫
An−2
n−2∏
r=1
xkpr−1r(
1−
n−2∑
l=1
xl
)k(pn−1+pn)−1
dxn−2 . . . dx1.
Using the same trick, for the next step, let y :=
n−3∑
l=1
xl and
u := xn−21−y . Then P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] is equal to
1
B(kp)
Γ(kpn−2)Γ(kpn−1)Γ(kpn)
Γ(k(pn−2 + pn−1 + pn))
∫
An−3
n−3∏
r=1
xkpr−1r(
1−
n−3∑
l=1
xl
)k(pn−2+pn−1+pn)−1
dxn−3 . . . dx1.
We continue to adopt the same change of variable strategy
until we are left with an integral over the region A|W |+1,
which concludes the proof. 
In the previous lemma we showed how to calculate
P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1]. In particular we showed that instead of an
(n− 1)-fold integral of the Dirichlet PDF, the computations
can be reduced to a |W |-fold integral. However, the expres-
sion still depends on the input vector p, which is undesirable
and generally incompatible with differential privacy. The
reason is that (, δ)-differential privacy is a guarantee for
all adjacent input data and not for a specific data point. In
the next lemma, we show that P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] is a log-
concave function of p over the region ∆(η,η¯)n , which we will
use to derive a bound for δ that holds for all p of interest.
Lemma 2. Let W be a given set of indices which is used to
construct ∆(η,η¯)n and let M(k)D be the Dirichlet mechanism
with parameter k and input p. Then, P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] is a
log-concave function of p over the domain ∆(η,η¯)n .
The proof of this lemma may be found in the extended
version at [25]. Revisiting the definition of Ω1,Ω2 in (3)
and (4), we find that
P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω2] = 1− P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] (8)
≤ 1−min
p
P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] = δ.
From this, we see that bounding δ can be by minimiz-
ing P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1], an explicit form of which was given
in Lemma 1. Above, we established the log-concavity of
the function that we seek to minimize. As a result, instead
of minimizing P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] over the entire continuous
domain of ∆(η,η¯)n , we can only consider the extreme points.
Note that the set of points within ∆(η,η¯)n form a polyhedron
with at most |W |(|W | + 1)/2 vertices. As the minimum of
an unsorted list of n entries can be found in linear time,
the time complexity of finding minP[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] is
O(|W |2). This analytical bound will be further explored
through numerical results in Section VI. Next, we develop
analogous bounds for .
B. Computing 
As above, fix η, η¯ ∈ (0, 1), b ∈ (0, 1], and W ⊆ [n − 1].
Then, for a given k ∈ R+, bounding  requires evaluating
the term
log
(
P[M(k)D (p) = x]
P[M(k)D (q) = x]
)
,
where p and q are any b-adjacent vectors in ∆(η,η¯)n . Let i, j ∈
W be the indices in which p and q differ. Using the definition
of the Dirichlet mechanism, we find
log
(
P[M(k)D (p) = x]
P[M(k)D (q) = x]
)
= log
B(kq)
n∏
i=1
xkpi−1i
B(kp)
n∏
i=1
xkqi−1i

= log
(
Γ(kqi)Γ(kqj)x
kpi−1
i x
kpj−1
j
Γ(kpi)Γ(kpj)x
kqi−1
i x
kqj−1
j
)
= log
(
Γ(kqi)Γ(kqj)
Γ(kpi)Γ(kpj)
x
k(pi−qi)
i x
k(pj−qj)
j
)
.
Since p and q are b-adjacent, we have that pi+pj = qi+ qj .
Therefore, we can compute  by evaluating the term
log
(
Γ(kqi)Γ(kqj)
Γ(kpi)Γ(kpj)
(
xi
xj
)k(pi−qi))
. (9)
Note that if either xi or xj goes to 0, then the term in (9)
would be unbounded. Recalling that the indices in which p
and q can differ at are restricted to the set W , we find that
the values at these indices must be bounded below by η, and
therefore the ratios of interest remain bounded as well.
Lemma 4 below will provide an explicit value of , aided
in part by the next lemma.
Lemma 3. Let W be a given set of indices which is used
to construct ∆(η,η¯)n and let p, q be any b-adjacent vectors
in ∆(η,η¯)n with their ith and jth entries different. Then, for a
constant k ∈ R+, we have that
beta(kqi, kqj)
beta(kpi, kpj)
≤ beta(kqi, k(1− η¯ − qi))
beta(kpi, k(1− η¯ − pi)) .
The proof of this lemma may be found in the extended
version of this paper at [25].
Lemma 4. Let W be a given set of indices which is used to
construct ∆(η,η¯)n and M(k)D be a Dirichlet mechanism with
parameter k. Then, for all x ∈ Ω1 we have that
log
(
P[M(k)D (p) = x]
P[M(k)D (q) = x]
)
≤
log
(
beta(kη, k(1− η¯ − η))
beta(k(η + b2 ), k(1− η¯ − η − b2 ))
)
+
kb
2
log
(
1− (|W | − 1))γ
γ
)
,
where the parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) takes the same value of γ
used to compute δ in Section III-A.
Proof. Let
v := max
p,q,x
log
(
Γ(kqi)Γ(kqj)
Γ(kpi)Γ(kpj)
(
xi
xj
)k(pi−qi))
subject to |pi − qi| ≤ b
2
,
pi + pj = qi + qj ,
pi + pj ≤ 1− η¯,
p(i,j) ∈ [η, 1− η¯ − η],
q(i,j) ∈ [η, 1− η¯ − η],
x(i,j) ∈ [γ, 1− (|W | − 1)γ] ,
(10)
and let C denote the set of feasible points of the optimization
problem in (10); we note that the first constraint enforces
adjacency, while the others encode p, q ∈ ∆(η,η¯)n and x ∈ Ω1.
By sub-additivity of the maximum, we have
v ≤ max
p,q,x∈C
log
(
Γ(kqi)Γ(kqj)
Γ(kpi)Γ(kpj)
)
+
max
p,q,x∈C
log
(
xi
xj
)k(pi−qi)
. (11)
Now, with
v1 := max
p,q,x∈C
log
(
xi
xj
)k(pi−qi)
,
we find
v1 ≤ max
p,q,x∈C
|k(pi − qi)|
∣∣∣∣log(xixj
)∣∣∣∣
=
kb
2
log
(
1− (|W | − 1)γ
γ
)
.
Next, let c := pi + pj = qi + qj and substitute qj , pj with
c− qi and c− pi respectively. Let
v2 := max
pi,qi,c
log
(
Γ(kqi)Γ(k(c− qi))
Γ(kpi)Γ(k(c− pi))
)
subject to |pi − qi| ≤ b
2
,
c ∈ [2η, 1− η¯],
pi ∈ [η, 1− η¯ − η],
qi ∈ [η, 1− η¯ − η],
where the constraints again encode adjacency of p and q and
their containment in ∆(η,η¯)n .
Then, from Lemma 3 and Equation (7), we have that
v2 ≤ max
pi,qi,c
log
(
beta(kqi, k(1− η¯ − qi))
beta(kpi, k(1− η¯ − pi))
)
subject to |pi − qi| ≤ b
2
,
pi ∈ [η, 1− η¯ − η],
qi ∈ [η, 1− η¯ − η].
(12)
Evaluating the gradient of the objective function in the
optimization problem in (12), it can be shown that the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of optimality are not
satisfied in the interior of the set of feasible points except
for points that lie on the line pi = qi. However, since the
KKT conditions are only sufficient conditions (see chapter
11 of [28]), satisfying them does not imply optimality which
is indeed the case here.
Evaluating points on the boundary of the feasible region
shows that KKT conditions are also not satisfied, thus, the
only points remaining are (pi, qi)’s in the set{(
η +
b
2
, η
)
,
(
1− η¯ − η − b
2
, 1− η¯ − η
)
,(
η, η +
b
2
)
,
(
1− η¯ − η, 1− η¯ − η − b
2
)}
. (13)
Note that since beta(a, b) = beta(b, a), the points in the
first row give equal positive objectives and the points in the
second row have equal negative objectives. Hence, we can
choose the first point in Equation (13) to find
v2 = log
(
beta(kη, k(1− η¯ − η))
beta(k(η + b2 ), k(1− η¯ − η − b2 ))
)
. (14)
Substituting v1 and v2 in (11) concludes the proof. 
We now state the main theorem of this section, which
formally establishes the (, δ)-differential privacy of the
Dirichlet mechanism for identity queries.
Theorem 1. Fix η, η¯ ∈ (0, 1) and b ∈ (0, 1], and consider b-
adjacent vectors p, q ∈ ∆(η,η¯)n . Let W ⊆ [n − 1] be a
given set of indices which is used to construct ∆(η,η¯)n . Then
the Dirichlet mechanism with parameter k ∈ R+ is (, δ)-
differentially private, where
 = log
(
beta(kη, k(1− η¯ − η))
beta(k(η + b2 ), k(1− η¯ − η − b2 ))
)
+
kb
2
log
(
1− (|W | − 1)γ
γ
)
,
and
δ = 1−min
p
P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1].
Proof. The expression for  results immediately from
Lemma 4 and the expression for δ is a direct result of (8). 
The expression given for  in Theorem 1 contains a ratio of
beta functions. In the following lemma we present upper and
lower bounds for beta functions in terms of simpler functions
to provide a simplified upper bound for .
Lemma 5. Let a, b > 1. Then
exp (2− a− b) ≤ beta(a, b) ≤ a+ b− 1
(2a− 1)(2b− 1) . (15)
Proof: See [25]. 
Lemma 5 offers a straightforward simplification of The-
orem 1, though due to space restrictions we evaluate its
accuracy numerically.
Remark. Note that if a mechanism is 1-differentially private,
it is also 2-differentially private for all 2 ≥ 1. Therefore,
if the upper bound for  after simplification of beta functions
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6
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6
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a: η = 0.15, η¯ = 0.15, k = 6.7 b: η = 0.20, η¯ = 0.20, k = 5.1 c: η = 0.25, η¯ = 0.25, k = 4.1
Fig. 1: An example where |W | = 3 to compare the approximated and original values of . At each level of δ, first γ is
optimized according to the optimization problem in (16), then the optimal γ is substituted in the expressions for the original
and approximated values.
is still within the acceptable range, e.g., δ ≤ 0.05 and
 ≤ 5 [29], [30], [31], then using the approximate value of 
does not substantially harm interpretation of the Dirichlet
mechanism’s protections. In Figure 1, for three instances
of (η, η¯, k) and b = 0.1, we show how the approximation
captures the behavior of . All three cases show that the
approximation causes an offset to the exact value of , and
the level of offset decreases with the value of the original .
Next, we point out that the parameter γ, which is used in
the definition of Ω2, is not a parameter of the mechanism,
in the sense that changing γ does not change the mechanism
itself. Instead, γ balances the trade-off between privacy level
and the probability of failing to guarantee that privacy level,
i.e., changing γ can decrease  in exchange for increasing δ
and vice versa.
In some cases, we are given the highest probability of
privacy failure, δ, that is acceptable, and one must maximize
the level of privacy subject to that upper bound. Let δˆ denote
maximum admissible value of δ. Then we are interested in
minimizing  while obeying δ ≤ δˆ. Using Theorem 1 to
substitute , let V be the set of vertices of ∆(η,η¯)n . Then we
must solve
min
γ
γ
subject to P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] ≥ 1− δˆ for all p ∈ V.
(16)
Note that the constraint set of the optimization problem (16)
form a convex set as the function P[M(k)D (p) ∈ Ω1] is a
strictly decreasing function of γ. Therefore,  can be opti-
mized for a given δˆ using off-the-shelf convex optimization
tool-boxes, and this will be done below in Section VI. Next,
we apply the Dirichlet mechanism to average queries.
IV. DIRICHLET MECHANISM FOR DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY OF AVERAGE QUERIES
In this section we consider a collection of N vectors
indexed over i ∈ [N ], with the ith denoted pi ∈ ∆◦n. The
goal is to compute the average of the collection {pi}i∈[N ]
while providing differential privacy. We first re-define the
adjacency relationship for the average query setting.
Definition 3. Fix a scalar b ∈ (0, 1]. Two collections
{pi}i∈[N ] and {qi}i∈[N ] are adjacent if there is some j such
that
1) pi = qi for all j 6= i,
2) there exist m and l such that pj−(m,l) = q
j
−(m,l) and
||pj(m,l) − qj−(m,l)|| ≤ b.
As mentioned earlier, the query we now consider is the
average. Set P = {pi}i∈[N ] and Q = {qi}i∈[N ]. Mathemat-
ically we write
A(P) := 1
N
N∑
i=1
pi, (17)
with A(Q) defined analogously. The next theorem formalizes
the privacy protections of the Dirichlet mechanism when
applied to such averages.
Theorem 2. Fix η, η¯ ∈ (0, 1) and b ∈ (0, 1]. Let W ⊆ [n−1]
be a given set of indices which is used to construct ∆(η,η¯)n ,
let P = {pi}i∈[N ] be a collection of N -vectors within
∆
(η,η¯)
n , let A(P) be the average of the collection, and
let Q = {qi}i∈[N ] be adjacent to P . Then the Dirichlet
mechanism with parameter k ∈ R+ and input A(P) is (, δ)-
differentially private, where
 = log
(
beta(kη, k(1− η¯ − η))
beta(k(η + b2n ), k(1− η¯ − η − b2n ))
)
+
kb
2n
log
(
1− (|W | − 1)γ
γ
)
, (18)
and
δ = 1− min
A(P)
P[M(k)D (A(P)) ∈ Ω1].
Proof. For all i ∈ [n], let A(pi) := A(P)i and x ∈ Ω1.
Then, we are interested in the quantity
P[M(k)D (A(P)) = x]
P[M(k)D (A(Q)) = x]
=
B(kA(Q))
n∏
i=1
x
kA(pi)−1
i
B(kA(P))
n∏
i=1
x
kA(qi)−1
i
. (19)
Based on the definition of the adjacency relationship for
average queries in Definition 3, A(p) and A(q) will differ
only in their mth and lth entries. Taking the logarithm from
both sides of (19) and using the same approach for the
identity queries we have that
log
(
P[M(k)D (A(P)) = x]
P[M(k)D (A(Q)) = x]
)
≤
max
A(P),A(Q)
log
(
B(kA(Q))
B(kA(P))
)
+ (20)
max
A(P),A(Q)
log
(
1− (|W | − 1)γ
γ
)k|A(pm)−A(qm)|
.
Because P and Q are b-adjacent, and each entry of A(·)
represents the average of the vectors, we have that
|A(pm)−A(qm)| ≤ b
2n
. (21)
Combining (20), (21) and Lemma 4 completes the proof for
the value of . For δ, same approach for calculating δ in
identity queries applies to average queries. 
Remark. As seen in (18), the level of privacy increases with
the number of vectors present in the collection. In particular,
 → 0 as n → ∞. This is consistent with the intuition that
it would be harder to track each individual of a population
when their data is mixed together in an act of averaging.
V. ACCURACY ANALYSIS
We briefly analyze the accuracy of the Dirichlet mecha-
nism by two metrics. First, in terms of the expected location
of the mechanism output on the unit simplex and second in
terms of the variance of the output vector.
Proposition 1. Let x ∈ ∆n be the output of a Dirichlet
mechanism with input p ∈ ∆◦n and parameter k ∈ R+. Then
we have that E[xi] = pi and
Var[xi] =
pi(1− pi)
k + 1
. (22)
Proof. See [25]. 
Remark. As seen in (22) the variance of the output depends
on the input data pi. However, we can find the worst-
case variance by maximizing the expression for the variance
which occurs at pi = 0.5. Hence, we have that
Var[xi] ≤ 1
4(k + 1)
. (23)
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we simulate the output of the Dirichlet
mechanism for an average query. As an example of average
queries, suppose we ask a number of experts for their opinion
on the probability of certain events happening, thus, a vector
in the unit simplex. In order to make a decision based on
all opinions, we need to integrate the opinions into one
[32]. One possible way of integrating the opinions is to
take the average of the opinions. Privatizing the average of
(a) Visualization of two 1-adjacent vector collections P and Q. The
left figure depicts P and the right figure corresponds to Q. The data
points with orange markers correspond to the vectors in which P
and Q differ.
(b) The output of the Dirichlet mechanism when the input is P
vs. Q. The left plot shows the case where k = 24 and the right
plot corresponds to k = 10. Each red data point corresponds
to an independent run of M(k)D (A(P)) and the blue data points
correspond to M(k)D (A(Q)).
Fig. 2: An average query on a collection of 100 vectors
within ∆3.
the experts’ opinion while keeping their individual forecasts
private is an example of average queries.
In Figure 2, we show an example of privatizing the
average of 100 experts’ opinions. In this example we have a
collection of opinions P , and we want to compare the output
of the Dirichlet mechanism with the output of the mechanism
when fed with a collection Q that is 1-adjacent to P .
We chose k = 24 to keep the variance of the output below
0.01 according to (23). We have fixed W to be the set {1, 2},
η = 0.05 and η¯ = 0.05. Using Theorem 2, for δˆ = 0.05, we
find that the mechanism is (1.18, 0.05)-differentially private.
Table I shows the empirical accuracy analysis of mechanism.
In Figure 2, we can observe that, given the location of the
mechanism output, it is not possible to determine with high
probability whether the input is P or Q. Table I, shows that
we were able to achieve the desired variance.
In order to illustrate the effect of changing k in the
mechanism accuracy, Figure 2b compares the output of the
mechanism when k = 24 and k = 10. As seen in the figure,
the output when k = 10 is less concentrated around the
average. It can also be seen that the probability that the
output belongs to Ω2 is higher when k = 10, which is
consistent with the expressions derived in the theorems.
Statistics Values
A(P) (0.314923, 0.315923, 0.320923)
A(Q) (0.314923, 0.320923, 0.315923)
MˆD(A(P)) (0.327731, 0.336119, 0.336149)
MˆD(A(Q)) (0.326620, 0.338976, 0.334402)
ˆV ar[MD(A(P)] (0.00934632, 0.00983122, 0.0102117)
ˆV ar[MD(A(Q)] (0.00922426, 0.0100889, 0.0100757)
TABLE I: Comparing the average of the output of the
mechanism with input collections P and Q, alongside with
their empirical variances. The values correspond to k = 24.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we introduced a mechanism used for priva-
tizing data inputs that belong to the unit simplex. We used
the Dirichlet distribution to probabilistically map a vector
within the unit simplex to itself. We proved that the Dirichlet
mechanism is differentially private with high probability in
both identity and average queries. Our simulation results
validated that the privacy bounds and the accuracy of the
mechanism are within ranges typically considered in the
differential privacy literature.
As an extension to this work, we are interested in applying
the Dirichlet mechanism to privatizing a policy in a Markov
decision process. In particular, we are interested in showing
how accurate the Dirichlet mechanism is in terms of the
total-accumulated rewards.
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APPENDIX
We first state a theorem from [21] which we later use to
prove Lemma 2.
Theorem 3. Let f1, . . . , fk be non-negative and Borel mea-
surable functions defined on Rn and let
r(t) = sup
λ1x1+···+λk=t
f1(x1)...fk(xk), t ∈ Rn,
where λ1, . . . , λk are positive constants satisfying the equal-
ity λ1 + · · · + λk = 1. Then, the function r(t) also Borel
measurable and we have the following inequality∫
Rn
r(t)dt ≥
(∫
Rn
f
1
λ1
1 dt
)λ1
. . .
(∫
Rn
f
1
λk
k dt
)λk
.
A. Proof of Lemma 2
We first review the definition of log-concave functions. A
function g : Rn 7→ R is said to be log-concave if for all
x1, x2 ∈ Rn and θ ∈ [0, 1], we have that
g(θx1 + (1− θ)x2) ≥ (g(x1))θ(g(x2))1−θ.
The above condition is equivalent to
g(t) ≥ sup
θu+(1−θ)v=t
g(u)θg(v)1−θ.
Note that function g is log-concave if and only if log g is
concave. Next, for x ∈ R|W | and p ∈ ∆(η,η¯)|W | let f : R|W | ×
∆
(η,η¯)
|W | 7→ [0, 1] be
f(x, p) =
∏
i∈W
xkpi−1i
(
1− ∑
i∈W
xi
)k(1− ∑
i∈W
pi)−1
B(kpW )
.
For a fixed p ∈ ∆η,η¯|W |, let
f1(x) := f(x, p).
Function f1(x) is the Dirichlet probability distribution func-
tion with parameter α ∈ RW where α := kpW . Since
p ∈ ∆η,η¯|W |, we have that αi ≥ 1, for all i ∈ [|W |]. Therefore
f1 is a log-concave function [22]. Therefore,
f(tx, p) ≥ sup
αux+(1−α)vx=tx
f(ux, p)
αf(vx, p)
1−α, (24)
for all p ∈ ∆(η,η¯)|W | , tx, ux, vx ∈ R|W | and α ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly, for a fixed x ∈ R|W |, let
f2(p) := f(x, p).
Evaluating the Hessian of log f2(p), let
ψ¯ := ψ(0)
k
1− ∑
i∈[|W |]
xi
 ,
where ψ(0) is the digamma function. Then,
−
(∇2 log f2(p))i,j
k2
=
{
ψ(0)(kpi) + ψ¯ i = j
ψ¯ i 6= j ,
The digamma function is strictly increasing on interval
(0,+∞). Therefore, the Hessian matrix is a sum of two
negative semi definite matrices and as a result, negative semi
definite itself. The aforementioned argument results in log-
concavity of f2(p). Therefore,
f(x, tp) ≥ sup
βup+(1−β)vp=tp
f(x, up)
βf(x, vp)
1−β , (25)
for all x ∈ R|W |, tp, up, vp ∈ ∆(η,η¯)|W | and β ∈ [0, 1]. Let
λ ∈ [0, 1], choose u˜x, v˜x, u˜p, v˜p such that
λu˜x + (1− λ)v˜x = tx,
λu˜p + (1− λ)v˜p = p.
Assigning ux to x in (25), we find
f(ux, p) ≥ sup
βup+(1−β)vp=p
f(ux, up)
βf(ux, vp)
1−β
≥ f(ux, u˜p)λf(ux, v˜p)1−λ. (26)
Similarly, we can write
f(vx, p) ≥ sup
βup+(1−β)vp=p
f(vx, up)
βf(vx, vp)
1−β
≥ f(vx, u˜p)λf(vx, v˜p)1−λ. (27)
Revisiting (24), using (26) and (27), we can write
f(tx, p) ≥ sup
αux+(1−α)vx=tx
f(ux, p)
αf(vx, p)
1−α
≥ sup
λu˜x+(1−λ)v˜x=tx
f(ux, p)
λf(vx, p)
1−λ (28)
≥ sup
λu˜x+(1−λ)v˜x=tx
f(ux, u˜p)
λ2f(ux, v˜p)
λ(1−λ)
f(vx, u˜p)
(1−λ)λf(vx, v˜p)(1−λ)
2
.
The second line in (28) is true since we have fixed α and
the set of points satisfying the constraints is a subset of one
where we are free to adjust α. Note that
λu˜x + (1− λ)v˜x =
λ2u˜x + λ(1− λ)u˜x + λ(1− λ)v˜x + (1− λ)2v˜x.
Since λ2 + λ(1− λ) + λ(1− λ) + (1− λ)2 = 1, Theorem 3
applies. Therefore, we can write∫
A
f(tx, p)dtx ≥(∫
A
f(ux, u˜p)dux
)λ2 (∫
A
f(ux, v˜p)dux
)λ(1−λ)
(∫
A
f(vx, u˜p)dvx
)(1−λ)λ(∫
A
f(vx, v˜p)dvx
)(1−λ)2
.
By renaming the variables tx, ux and vx to x inside the
integrals and merging the similar terms into one, we find∫
A
f(x, p)dx ≥(∫
A
f(x, u˜p)dx
)λ(∫
A
f(x, v˜p)dx
)(1−λ)
,
where λu˜p + (1−λ)v˜p = p. Therefore,
∫
A f(x, p)dx is log-
concave which concludes the promised results. 
B. Proof of Lemma 3
Let
c := pi + pj
= qi + qj .
Then using (7), we have that
beta(kpi, kpj)
beta(kqi, kqj)
=
Γ(kqi)Γ(k(c− qi))
Γ(kpi)Γ(k(c− pi))
=
Γ(kqj)Γ(k(c− qj))
Γ(kpj)Γ(k(c− pj)) .
(29)
Using the definition of digamma function, we have
∂
∂x
[
Γ(x− a)
Γ(x− b)
]
=
Γ(x− a)[ψ(0)(x− a)− ψ(0)(x− b)]
Γ(x− b) .
(30)
As the digamma function is strictly increasing on interval
(0,+∞), the derivative in (30) is positive if and only if x−
b < x − a, which is true if and only if a < b. Returning to
(29), we will construct an upper bound using the first identity
if qi < pi and we will construct an upper bound using the
second identity if qj < pj . For correctness, suppose qi < pi.
Then
beta(kpi, kpj)
beta(kqi, kqj)
=
Γ(kqi)Γ(k(c− qi))
Γ(kpi)Γ(k(c− pi))
≤ beta(kqi, k(1− η¯ − qj))
beta(kpi, k(1− η¯ − pi)) .
The other case will work identically. 
C. Proof of Lemma 5
From Jensen’s inequality we have that
φ
(∫ b
a
f dx
)
≤
∫ b
a
φ(f) dx,
where f is integrable over the domain of interest and φ is
a convex function. Since the exponential function is convex,
we have that
beta(a, b) =
∫ 1
0
exp
(
log
(
xa−1(1− x)b−1))dx
≥ exp
(∫ 1
0
log
(
xa−1(1− x)b−1) dx).
Evaluating the integral, we find
exp
(∫ 1
0
log
(
xa−1(1− x)b−1) dx) =∫ 1
0
(a− 1) log(x) + (b− 1) log(1− x)dx = 2− (a+ b).
Then
beta(a, b) ≥ exp(2− (a+ b)).
The upper bound follows from the identity that
2αβ ≤ α2 + β2, for all α, β ∈ R.
Substituting α, β with xa−1 and yb−1 in the integral repre-
sentation of the beta function results in the introduced upper
bound. 
D. Proof of Proposition 1
Let p¯ =
n∑
r=1
kpr. Using equation (49.9) in [33] we can
write
E[xi] =
kpi
p¯
= pi,
and
Var[xi] =
kpi(p¯− kpi)
p¯2(p¯+ 1)
.
Since input p belongs to the unit simplex, we have that p¯ = k.
Substituting p¯ with k concludes the promised results. 
